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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF TH[ STATE OF UTAH 
THE STERLING PRESS, 













C. L. PETTIT and JOHN SYBROWSKY, 
dba INVESTORS PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
Case No. 15304 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge. 
David H. Day, of 
DAY & BARNEY 
4924 Pop] ar Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
W. Jeffery Fillmore, of 
BIELE, HASLA/1 & HATCH 
80 \{est Broad~1ay, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent, The Sterling 
Press 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellant, 
C. L. Pettit and John Sybrowsky dba 
Investors Publishing Company 
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IN THE SUPREME COU~T 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STERLING PRESS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
C. L. PETTIT and JOHN SYBROWSKY, 
dba INVESTORS PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 15304 
STATEI1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, as payee of a check, seeks recovery 
from the makers of their unpaid check. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court granted Judgment to Plaintiff-Respondent against 
Defendants-Appel I ants for the amount of their unpaid check together with 
an attorney's fee. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the Judgment of the Trial 
Court affirmed. 
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STAIEIIEriT OF F !1C T~. 
Th2 Plaintiff-Respondent, The2 Sterl inCJ Pr<'"·'·· ("Pl;;irll iff" 
hereafter) operates a printing business and printed the magazine, 
"The Utah Equestrian", for the Defendants-Appellants, C. L, Pettit 
and John Sybr01·1sky ("Defendants" hereafter). The Defendants signed 
and delivered to Plaintiff their check dated January 5, 1974! 
as 
payment for printing t1~o issues of the Defendant's magazine, The 
check on its face sho·ds it to be drawn on the account of Investors 
Publishing Company and it is signed by both Defendants. The check 
does not refer to any corporation nor have the signers shown that 
they signed in any representative capacity. 
At the time the printing services were rendered and at the 
time the check ~tas given, the Defendants had not registered the trade 
names of "Investors Publishing Company" or "The Utah Equestrian".2 
The Plaintiff deposited the check and the check was re-
turned without payment because at the time the check was issued and 
at a II subsequent times the Defendants did not have any funds in 
their bank account with which to pay the check and the bank refus~ 
3 payment. Plaintiff has not been paid for the printing services 
represented by the check. 4 
5 The check was issued on January 5, 1974. P I a i n t i ff com-
menced this action on March 12, 1974.
6 Plaintiff forwarded their 
!Exhibit P-2; Record pages 
2Record page 43. 
3Transcript pages 16, 
4Transcript page 16; 
13, 16, 18. 
5Exhibit P-2; Record 
6Record page 4. 
17; Exhibits P-1, P-16. 
Record pages 13, 16, 18. 
pages 13, 16, 18. 
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Re~ucsls for Acl~dss ions to Defendants on Apri I 29, 19711_? On May 
16, 1974 Lhe Defendants filed their certificate with the Secretary 
of Statc,'s Office registering the trade name "Investors Publishing 
Company" and the trade name "The Utah Equestrian" was never regis-
tered. 8 
The magazine at Page 1 states that it was pub] ished by 
Investors Publishing Company, C. L. Pettit, President.9 Inter-
national Land Corporation is not mentioned anywhere in the maga-
zine. T1·1o real estate ads arpear in the magazine ~lithout mention 
of International Land Corporation. The real estate advertisements 
are only two pages out of the fifteen pages of advertising in the 
magazine. 
The Plaintiff sent its invoices to the Utah Equestrian for 
the printing services rendered. 10 The invoices were paid except for 
the last two for which the subject check were given. 
The two checks that Defendants introduced as evidence of a 
corporate payment are dated December 21 and 27, 1972, over one year 
b . h k d f h f" 0 11 before the su Ject c ec , an were payment or t e 1rst tssue. 
Although the Defendants state in their Brief at page 3 that all of the 
services were paid for by checks drawn on International Land Corpora-
tion, the Defendants did not choose to introduce any additional checks 
as supporting evidence, nor is there any testimony of such fact in the 
transcript. 
?Record page 13. 
8Record page 43. 
9Exhibit P-3. 
lOExhibit P-1. 
]]Exhibits D-5, D-6; Transcript page 22. 
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The Plaintiff's officer te<,cifie•' th•t ~,:~ c c 
- J u ' - t ''''"'J"l he c·ns de: 
ing 1·1ith the individuals and th•c: i r invoices and the f ' 
c 1:.:- c~~ ,-e,_e i ved' tr,. 
gether with the magazine, support his contention that ha ~ l-iaS 1'/0r~ing 
with the individuals and not with a corporation.12 
ARGUI\ENT OF RESPONDEIIT 
POINT l 
THE DE FENDAriTS ARE PERSOIJALL Y Ll ABLE FOR BUS IIIESS 
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED IN A TRADE NNIE 
At all times that the Defendants were doing business c·lith the 
Plaintiff, the Defendants had not registered their trade names of "In-
vestors Pub] ishing Co171pany" or "The Utah Equestrian". 
The Utah State Legislature has i!71posed the burden upon anyone 
transacting business under an assumed name to register the assumed name: 
"Every person .•• who shall carry on, conduct or trans-
act business in this State under an assu171ed name, whether 
such business be carried on, conducted or transacted as an 
individual, association, partnership, corporation or other-
~lise shall file in the office of the Secretary of State a 
certificate setting forth the name.of ••• such business and 
the full true ••• names of the ••• persons owning and the ... 
persons carrying on, conducting or transacting such business, 
the location of the principal place of business and the post 
office address of such ••• persons ••• "13 
The Statute further makes it a misdeneanor to conduct busines• 
without the proper registration. 
12Transcript pages 8, 11-15, 18-20, 24. 
13sec. 42-2-5, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
-4- l 
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Courts have held that 11herc: persons fa i I to register a trade 
rare, the persons are deemed to be conductin3 the business for and on 
behalf of themsel'les only and not for any other entity and the indivi-
duals are personally I iable for the obi igations incurred in the assumed 
14 
nane. 
The Legislature has also imposed personal I iabil ity upon per-
sons who conduct business as a corporation without proper registration. 
"All persons ~1ho assume to act as a corporation ~lith­
out authority so to do shall be jointly and severally 
I iable for all debts and I iabil ities incurred or arising 
as a result thereof."l5 
16 This Court in a recent case upheld the above statute and 
found personal I iabi I ity against individuals ~1ho were transacting busi-
ness as a corporation without proper statutory qualification of the 
corporation. In this case the Defendants, at the time they did busi-
ness with the Plaintiff, had not properly qualified their assumed name 
either as a corporation itself or as an assumed name of a duly qual i-
fied corporation. 
Only after Plaintiff commenced this action did the Defendants 
register one of their trade names, Investors Publishing Company!? This 
belated filing was over a year after the Plaintiff commenced business 
dealings ~Jith the Plaintiff; was more than four months after the sub-
ject check ~1as issued; was more than t1-1o months after this action was 
14oakason vs. Lisbon Valley Uranium Co., 154 F.Supp. 692; 
Putnam vs. Industrial Comm .. 80 U. 187, 14 P.2d 973. 
15sec. 16-10-139, U.C.A., 1953, as a171ended. 
16Gi II ham Advertising Agency, Inc. vs. lpson, 567 P.2d 163. 
17Record page 43. 
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commei)Ccd ~ and, \-;as rTJore than t1.·;o vh:~k.s uft,~r Pl · t · f'- h ·' 
,, rrl ' r ~u subrcittc 
their Requ2st for Admissions to the Ccfcndnt rc•:.·,r:lir·rOJ '· 
the registr~tion of the trade name. 
Tile Plaintiff's officer thought that he: 1·1as r!'Oal ing ... 1ith 
individuals 13 and this \·las corroboruted by the \IJY t~2 Plaintiff 
billed for the services on its irrvoices. 19 The testi:rony in the de· 
posit ion of Defendant's witness, Ann Garrett, was only based on her 
supposition and not from any clear recollection of the conversation 
regarding representative capacity. She v1as not involved vlith the 
management of the Defendants Company, nor \·las she an investor and 
had no responsibility for payment of their accounts. 20 Plaintiff's 
officer's recollections were of the specific discussions with Defen· 
dants of payment for Plaintiff's services. 
The Plaintiff was further justified in thinking that it VIas 
doing business with individuals because all during the time that the 
parties had their business transaction the Secretary of State's Office 
had no registration of a trade name or a qualified corporation of the 
names used by Defendants. The documents introduced by the Defendant 
as exhibits to prove they were acting on behalf of a corporationVIere 
totally irrelevant. The bank account records are records owned by 
the bank and the Plaintiff would have no access to those records. 
IBTranscript pages 8, 11-15, 18-20, 24. 
I 9Exh i bit P-1 • 
20Deposition page 13, 18. 
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Th,' PlcJir1lit-f had no access to the: (.(Jr~,(>r,1 te r(>_l)rcl_J of the Interna-
tional LZJn,_l Coqxnalion and I·Jas n0t e\;en (~ntar 2 0 ; tt~ 3 ~ C·::>r~ordtion. 
Th~ r:1J~Z12inc itself only refers to the trade naCJe and not to a corpo-
ration. The tax comMission registration and warrants, bulk nail per-
nits and business I icenses are totally beyorrd the sco;oe of reasonable 
inquiry by th~ Plaintiff and most of 11hich were obtained long after 
t:1e initial business contract bet1·1een Plaintiff and Defendant. 
It vlould be an unreasonable, indeed im~ossible, burden upon 
the Plaintiff to make the thorough daily search that Defendant argues 
is required to be made to determine whether or not custo-,ers are 
either a duly qualified corporation or a duly registered trade name. 
Even if this is the burden upon the Plaintiff, the investigation would 
not have been fruitful because the various filings of the Defendants 
were made over an extended term rather than on one particular day and 
were made after Plaintiff started the printing jobs for Defendants. 
lt is not incumbent upon persons doing business with another 
to make daily checks of numerous sources just to determine whether or 
not they are in fact a corporation or a trade name. The Legislature 
established the burden of proper registration upon persons, such as 
the Defendants, who seek to hide behind the legislative effect of 
doing business as a corporation. Failure to properly register creates 
personal I iabi 1 ity to the Defendants. 
The business transaction involved in this case was routine 
and was not a large transaction for either party. Requiring the Plain-
-?-
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tiff lo check v11th the Sec1·'tary or' ~t,·Jte or 0 ·1" '· t. ~ ~ '1c.r ~ar 1 '"'> every day 
is cln unl-e.Jsonab!e burden upon connerce. Tire Lc·;islature adr,pted a 
simple solution: Register a trade nar1e \·lith the Secretary of State. 
The Trial Judge has completed iscret ion in deternining h' 
. ~-J I C h 
party is to be believed on disputed evidence and in this action there 
is substantial evidence and exhibits in the record to support Plain-
tiffs contentions and testinony th3t it was dealing \vith individuals 
and not with a corporation. The Trial Judge acted 1·easonab!y in de-
termining that as far as the outside world \·las concerned, the Defen-
dants \vere conducting the business of printing The Utah Equestrian as 
individuals and that the Plaintiff thought it \vas dealing v1ith indi-
vidual s in rendering its printing services and that the Defendants, 
therefore, are personally I iable for the indebtedness to Plaintiff. 
PO ItJT I I 
DEFENDANT MAKERS OF A CHECK WHO DID NOT INDICATE 
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE 
FOR PAYI·\EfJT OF THE CHECK 
The subject check written by the Defendants and deliver~ 
to Plaintiff shows that it is dra\·Jn on the account of "Investors 
21 Publishing Company" and that it is signed by each Defendant. The 
check does not indicate anywhere on the instrument that the payer is 
a trade name or othenvise connected with any other entity. Likewise, 
21Exhibit P-2; Record pages 13, 15, !6, 18. 
-8-
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tr12 rc is no inllication .Jt the signature J ine of any re:)resentative capa-
citY of the signers, the Defendants. The che:k 1.1as issu=d in payment 
of t\VO invoices submitted by Plaint iff to Defendants. \/hen the check 
,,.1as presented for payment on t1-10 occasions to the dra>~ee bank payment 
was refused and Defendants did not have money in the bank account with 
which to pay the check. 22 
The contract of the makers of a check is that they agree to 
pay it upon completion of the check, signing it and delivering it to 
23 the payee. Furthermore, the maker of a check implies that he is not 
only 1 iable for payment of the check but that the check will be paid 
24 
upon presentment to the drawee bank. 
The Uniform Commercial Code imposes a duty upon the Defen-
dants to indicate their representative capacity. By failing to indi-
cate the representative capacity on the subject check the Defendants 
become individually 1 iable. The Code provides at Section 3-403: 25 
"(2) An authorized representative who signs his own 
name to an instrument: 
(a) is personally obi igated if the instrument 
neither names the person represented nor shows 
that the representative signed in a representa-
tive capacity; 
(b) except as otherwise established between the 
immediate parties, is personally obligated if 
the instrument names the person represented but 
does not show that the representative signed 
any representative capacity •.• " 
22Record pages 13, 16, 18; Exhibits P-16, P-2. 
23sec. 70A-3-413, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 24Pollin vs. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. Super. 87, 236 A.2d 542 
(1967); Riley vs. First State Bank, 469 S.l4.2d 812 (Texas 1971). 
25sec. 70A-3-403, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
-9-
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The only indication of re!)resentative c1pacity 
0 
h 
n t e chec' 
is the n,lme "Investors Pub] ishing Co:'l'oany''. 11 h 
'"' Ol'lever, t e Defcndunts 
had not registered any such entity nacoe so that the Plaintiffs could 
not have kno1m that the Defendants ,.,"reacting in a repres<C.ntative 
capacity. As previously discussed under Point 
of this Brief, th~re 
is substantial competent evidence to support the Trial Court's deter-
mination that the Plaintiffs believed they 1·1<cre conducting business 
1~ith individuals and that the Plaintiff did not knov1 that the Defen-
dants were acting in a representative capacity. 
Because the Defendants did not indicate on their check that 
they ~¥ere signing as a representative, the Plaintiffs acted reasonably 
in relying on the check and in believing they 1·1ere conducting business 
with individuals. 
The Defendants could easily have indicated any representative 
capacity on the check by merely 11riting their title or agency relation· 
ship. The failure of the Defendants to state their representative cap-
acity on the check or othenlise establish that they \)ere an agent of 
another entity for the effect of making the check their personal check 
and, therefore, they are 1 iable personally for its payment.26 
POl NT Ill 
DEFEtlDAriTS ARE LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Defendants issued their check to Plaintiff in payment of 
the printing services. The printing services \•Jould not have been 
260. P. Ganjo, Inc. vs. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super. 
517, 261 A.2d. 722 ( 1969); Industrial Finance Co. vs. Lovel; 
9 Hash. App. 829, 515 P.2d. 1304 (1973). See similar hold-
ings of cases cited in footnote 24. 
-10-
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rcnckn·d 1.ithoul the delivery of the chr2ck.27 The ch~ck 11as not paid 
by th2 oa11c b·.>causc of lack of funds in t:le account on ,.1hich it c1as 
drc:nm ilnd th·' check 1-1as returned to the Piaintiffs. 23 The Plaintiff 
contacted the Defendants by telephone and by personal visit after the 
check 1·1as returned and the Defendants told th~ Plaintiff that the 
check 1vould be paid upon further presentment and to redeposit the 
29 
check. The Plaintiff redeposited the check and it was returned un-
paid a second time by the drawee bank.30 Neither the check nor the 
account for the printing services has been paid. 
The Plaintiff has met the burdens of proof set forth in 
Chapter 15 of Title 7 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, and the Court found, 
under the statute, that the Defendants issued the checks to the Plain-
tiff for the value of the printing services so that Plaintiff would 
render the printing services and that the check was drawn on an ac-
count in 1·1hich there were not sufficient funds to pay the check. The 
Plaintiff gave notice to the Defendant that the initial deposit had 
not been paid and thereafter, the Defendants made no attempt to either 
have the check paid or made any additional deposits to the account with 
which to pay the check. 
The statute provides the basis for the Court to find that the 
check was issued and delivered wilfully ~olith the intent to defraud the 
2~Transcript pages l 2' 13, l 5. 2 Transcript page l 6. 
29Transcript pages 16, 17. 
30Transcript page 17; Exhibit P-2. 
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Plainliff. There is ar1plc evidence in th':'. record froe1 c)hich tn 2 CGJc· 
found thal Plaintiff is entitled under the stat t t u e o an a"ard of ac 
attorney's fee. 
COtlCLUS I 0:1 
The Defendants' business dealings vlith the Plaintiff \·Jere 
personal and the obi igations incurred in the transactions are per-
sonal 1 iabil ities of the Defendants. The Defendants failed to Pro-
perly register the assumed name under v1hich they claim they were doins 
business and they failed to indicate any representative capacity~ 
Plaintiff in its business dealings or on the check issued. The check 
was issued against an account in v1hich there v1ere not sufficient funds 
to pay the check. The Defendants are personally I iable, as the Trial 
Court found, for the ar:1ount of the check together 1vith interest, a 
reasonable attorney's fee and the costs incurred. The Trial Court 
judgment should be affirmed. 
-12-
Respectfully submitted, 
W. JEFFERY FILLMORE, of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
80 \1est Broadc-1ay, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent, The Sterling Press 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
